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V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a first degree murder case; its outcome ,.vill determine whether Mark 
Lankford will serve the harshest non-capital sentence a person can serve: a life sentence 
without the possibility of parole. Mark1 is challenging his judgment of conviction and 
sentence, as well as the district court's orders denying his requests for a new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were explained in Mark's 
Appellant's Brief and are incorporated here by reference. However, Mark does want to 
correct the State's misrepresentation of facts in its Statement of Facts and Course of 
Proceedings. After summarizing Mark's testimony, the State claims Mark's attorney, in 
closing argument, "conceded 'A lot of what [Lankford] said doesn't make sense to me."' 
(Resp't Br. 8 (quoting Tr., p.1859).) The State represents this statement reflects Mark's 
attorney did not believe Mark's testimony or think it made sense. That is false. The State 
took a snippet of counsel's argument and placed it completely out of context. The full 
quote from closing argument puts the statement in context, which gives it a meaning 
opposite of that assigned by the State. 
What Mark has told you has never changed in 25 years. A lot of what he 
said doesn't make sense to me having been raised in Montana and Idaho. 
I've never covered up my car in my life. I've never covered up my fire 
place. I don't put limbs over my fire place. When I leave I might throw 
some water on it or old coffee or something. Why would you do that? 
When I first became Mark's attorney the first thing I asked him, what did 
you cover your car up for? Why did you walk down the road and not take 
1 Mark Lankford is referenced herein by his first name, rather than Mr. Lankford, to 
distinguish him from his brothers, Bryan and Lee John, who will also be referenced by 
their first names. For consistency, Lane Thomas will be referenced herein by his first 
name. 
1 
your car? That is the stupidest thing I ever heard of. Well, it was my pride 
and joy. I had everything I had in it I didn't want anybody to that 
car. I didn't want anybody to steal it. You don't know what it's like in 
You your car out there somebody is going to take stuff. 
It made sense, especially after Mr. Urban Valentine testified that Texas is 
mostly private ground and the reason he went out on the Trinity River was 
because the person who was renting that farm ground or that bottomland 
was wanting those people trespassed. And when you grow up in Idaho 
where 90 percent of the property in this state is public ground, you don't 
even think about those things. Youjust go up into the forest and camp. 
(Tr., p.1859, L.15 p.1860, L.13 (emphasis added).) The only concession defense 
counsel made in closing argument was that growing up in Idaho and Montana, he was 
ignorant of why Mark did things the way he did, but once Mark explained why, "It made 
sense .... " 
Mark also objects to the State's repeated failure to cite to specific lines of the 
transcripts it relies upon in its briefing. Idaho Appellate Rule 35( e) requires citation to the 
reporter's transcript, including the transcript page and line number; this requirement 
applies not only to attorneys, but to pro se litigants on appeal. (Idaho Pro Se Appellate 
Handbook, How should I format my citations?, PDF pp.15-16, 
http://\vvvw.isc.idaho.gov/files/IdahoAppel1ateinforn1ationHandbook 2013.pdf, last 
viewed October 2, 2015.) Mark Lankford has complied with the appellate mles and 
provided this Court with citation to portions of transcripts he relies upon to support his 
claims, including relevant page and line numbers. In contrast, the State places the onus on 
Mark and this Court to divine which portions of cited transcript pages it relies upon to 
support its arguments. The State's consistent failure to cite to transcript line numbers and 
follow basic citation rules that govern even pro se litigants, cannot be condoned. Mark 
urges this Court to disregard the State's citation to transcripts which fail to include line 
numbers. 
2 
ISSUES2 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY PROVIDING MARK'S JURY 
IMPROPER AND AMBIGUOUS INSTRUCTIONS 
RELIEVED THE ST ATE OF ITS BURDEN OF PROOF AND 
DEPRIVED HIM OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR 
TRIAL UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND IDAHO 
CONSTITUTIONS 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S INSTRUCTION TELLING JURORS OF 
MARK'S PRIOR CHARGES, CONVICTIONS AND APPELLATE 
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE SAME OFFENSES IN THIS CASE 
VIOLATED MARK'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
MARK'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE COURT'S 
VIOLATIONS OF IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2405 
IV. THE PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO AND 
ELICITATION OF TESTIMONY REGARDING MARK'S PRIOR BAD 
ACTS, PRIOR CONVICTION, DEATH SENTENCE AND 
CONFINEMENT ON DEA TH ROW THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL, 
REP EA TEDL Y CALLING MARK A LIAR AND BOLSTERING 
TESTIMONY OF STATE WITNESSES IN CLOSING ARGUMENT, 
AND HIS SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING DEALS HE 
MADE FOR SNITCH TESTIMONY, CONSTITUTE MISCONDUCT 
ENTITLING MARK TO A NEW TRIAL 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING MARK'S MOTION TO 
CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE, OR A SENTENCE IMPOSED 
IN AN ILLEGAL MANNER, BASED ON UNTIMELINESS 
2Mark responds only to those issues which demand a response in light of the 
Respondent's Brief, but otherwise relies upon his prior briefing, which he incorporates 
here by reference. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred Bv Providing Mark's Jury With Improper And Ambiguous 
Instructions Which Relieved The State Oflts Burden Of Proof And Deprived Him Of His 
Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial Under The United States And Idaho Constitutions 
The district court's verbal and written instructions to Mark's jury, considered as a 
whole, gave conflicting explanations of the elements of first degree felony murder the 
State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Mark did not object to the 
problematic instructions, contrary to the State's claim (Resp't Br., pp.17-18), he did not 
ask for them either. Because the error was not invited, fundamental error review is 
proper. Mark must show the instructional defects are of constitutional dimension, they are 
plain from the record, and the instructions prejudiced him or misled the jury. Instructions 
like these which relieve the State of its burden of proof and allow it to gain a conviction 
without proving every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, meet the 
fundamental error standard because they violate due process and deprive a defendant of a 
fair trial. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 
472-73 (2012). 
Jurors were instructed that Mark was charged by information with two counts of 
first degree felony murder in which the State alleged he and/or his brother, Bryan, 
unlawfully and with malice aforethought killed Robert and Cheryl Bravence by beating 
them with an unknown object in the perpetration of a robbery. (JI 2, JI 4.) Jurors were 
twice instructed that for both counts of first degree murder, Mark could be found guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt if the State proved he was either "a principal to or aided and 
abetted in the commission of a robbery [ d]uring which an unlawful killing of Robert [ and 
Cheryl] Bravence occurred." (JI 4, JI 11.) The court explained to jurors that legally, there 
4 
is no difference between someone "who directly participates in the acts constituting a 
a person who, either before or during comm1ss10n, 
facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsel, solicits, invites, helps or hires another 
to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission." (JI 18.) The court 
further explained the law considers anyone who "participates in a crime either before or 
during its commission, by intentionally aiding, abetting, advising, hiring, counseling, 
procuring another to commit the crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission 
are guilty of the crime" to be a principal to the crime. (JI 19.) 
Both below and on appeal, the State argues because the Bravences' deaths 
occurred during the "stream of events" constituting the robbery, Mark is guilty. 
Specifically, the State argues "[b ]ased upon the testimony presented, it is certainly 
probable that, while the Bravences were mortally wounded at the campsite, they did not 
die until after their bodies were concealed."3 (Resp't Br., p.21.) The State thus argues 
Mark is responsible for the Bravences' deaths under the felony murder rule even if Bryan 
alone robbed the Bravences and killed them, or if Bryan mortally injured but did not kill 
the Bravences at the campsite, because he helped Bryan load their bodies in the van and 
conceal them. (Id. pp.21-22.) The State's argument reveals why the instructions, 
considered as a whole, were ambiguous and may have been applied by the jury in a way 
that relieved the State of its burden of proof. 
3The prosecutor suggested that even if the victims were dead when Mark took their 
property, he was guilty of robbery and felony murder. (Tr., p.1868, L.16-p.1869, L.6.) 
5 
Multiple theories regarding the robbery and homicides were presented to Mark's 
.
4 Under one of State's theories, Bryan and Mark formed the to steal the 
Bravences' van prior to the homicides, rendering them both liable for the homicides, 
regardless of who inflicted the fatal blows. Under the State's other theory, Bryan 
intended to steal the Bravences' van when he inflicted mortal or fatal injuries upon the 
couple; after Bryan took their van and belongings, Mark helped Bryan conceal their 
bodies and later benefited from the proceeds of the robbery. Under the defense theory, 
Bryan alone intended to steal the Bravences' van before he killed them, and after he 
completed the murders, Mark helped him conceal the bodies and benefitted from the 
robbery proceeds. 
Under the State's first theory, Mark would clearly be guilty of first degree felony 
murder because he had the intent to commit the robbery before the Bravences' were 
killed. However, under the State's second theory, and under the defense theory, Mark 
could not be guilty of first degree felony murder because he had no intent to rob the 
Bravences before they were killed by Bryan. Nevertheless, the prosecutor and judge told 
jurors that the crime of robbery could be committed against a deceased victim. (Tr., 
p.1868, L.16 p.1869, L.6.) Because the court's oral and written jury instructions were 
ambiguous and conflicting when considered as a whole, particularly when coupled with 
the prosecutor's arguments in closing, the jury may have found Mark guilty of first 
4In the Appellant's Brief, undersigned counsel stated two different theories were 
presented to the jury regarding the robbery and homicide. (Appellant's Br., p.29.) Insofar 
as this assertion limits the theories presented below to two options, it is inaccurate. There 
were two theories presented to the jury by the State, and one presented by the defense. 
6 
degree felony murder even though the State did not prove him guilty of every element of 
degree felony (robbery) murder beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Specifically, the State's argument to the jury below, and to this Court on appeal, 
is that if Mark benefited from the robbery after Bryan killed the Bravences, or if he 
helped Bryan hide their bodies after Bryan took their van and belongings against their 
will, before or after they breathed their last breaths, he is guilty of first degree felony 
murder. The State's arguments are legally incorrect. Mark was charged with first degree 
murder during the perpetration of a robbery. If Mark did not specifically intend to 
commit the robbery before it occurred, or before the Bravences were killed, he is not 
guilty of felony murder. See State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144 (201 0); State v. Cheatham, 
134 Idaho 565, 571 (2000). "Where the intent to commit the felony does not arise until 
after the homicide has occurred, the rationale behind the rule no longer applies." 
Cheatham, 134 Idaho at 571. As this Court observed in Cheatham, when the offense 
alleged is felony murder involving robbery, 
a taking is still robbery regardless of when the intent to formed, as long as 
the defendant's force motivated the victim's surrender of her property. 
When the force applied causes death, it is difficult to see how force could 
have motivated the victim to surrender the property, since the victim is 
dead. 
Id. at 570 (emphasis in original). Similarly, where the force used against the Bravences' 
to take their property against their will was inflicted only by Bryan, even if Mark helped 
moved their unconscious or lifeless bodies, Mark's actions could not have motivated the 
Bravences to surrender property Bryan had already taken by force. 
Mark's jury should have been clearly instructed that in light of the different 
theories presented by the parties, the threshold question it had to decide was whether the 
7 
State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mark-not Mark and Bryan, and not 
Bryan-intended to take the personal property of the Bravences from their person or 
immediate possession, against their will, by the intentional use or force of fear, prior to 
their deaths. The jury should have been instructed that if they did not find Mark 
specifically intended to take the Bravences' property from their person or immediate 
possession while they were alive, and against their will, by the intentional use of force or 
fear, either acting with Bryan or acting alone, they had to find Mark not guilty. While 
Mark's jury was provided with an instruction advising them they had to find Mark 
intended to rob the Bravences prior to their deaths (JI 12), when coupled with the aiding 
and abetting in the felony murder elements instruction (JI 11 ), the separate aiding and 
abetting instructions (JI 18-19), the prosecutor's arguments, and the judge's oral 
instructions, the jury could have found Bryan intended to rob the Bravences prior to their 
deaths, and because Mark later helped move their bodies and benefitted from the robbery 
proceeds, he was guilty as an aider and abettor. That is not the law, but the instructions, 
taken as a whole, allowed Mark's jury to reach such a conclusion. 
Moreover, when defense counsel tried to argue this point in closing argument, the 
prosecutor objected and the district court intervened. In closing argument, defense 
counsel was reading the robbery elements instruction (JI 13) to the jury and explaining 
why the State could not meet their burden of proof. Counsel restated the instruction and 
when he got to the allegation that Mark took the Bravences' property from their person or 
immediate presence, and against their will, he stated, "And this is the reason you can't 
rob a dead person---." (Tr., p.1868, L.16 - p.1869, L.6 (emphasis added).) The 
prosecutor objected: "Your Honor, I object. I don't think that is a correct statement of the 
8 
law." The district court, in the jury's presence, agreed with the prosecutor: "I don't either. 
Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, instructed on the law, so go to my instructions and 
refer to that." (Id) The court's instruction was a clear statement to jurors that, as a matter 
of law, you can rob a dead person. As a result, even if Mark did not do anything but take 
prope1iy from the Bravences after Bryan killed or mortally wounded them, Mark's own 
testimony would be sufficient for the jury to find him guilty of robbery and thus felony 
murder. Jurors were explicitly and repeatedly told the judge would instruct them on the 
law applicable to this case, and they had to consider the evidence in light of the judge's 
instructions on the law, regardless of their own beliefs. (JI 1, JI 3, JI 5, JI 10, JI 24, JI 25, 
JI 27.) 
For these reasons, the verbal and written jury instructions, taken as a whole, were 
ambiguous, conflicting and erroneous. The collective instructions allowed the jury to find 
Mark guilty of first degree murder even though the State did not have to prove every 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby violating Mark's due process 
rights and depriving him of a fair trial. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999); 
State v. Adamcik. 152 Idaho 445, 472-73 (2012). Accordingly, Mark's conviction must be 
vacated and his case remanded for a new trial. 
II. 
The District Court's Instruction Telling Jurors Mark Was Previouslv Charged And 
Convicted For These Offenses, Which Were The Subject Of A Prior Appeal, Violated 
Mark's Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial Before An Impartial Jury 
The district court's instruction telling jurors about Mark's prior charges, 
convictions and appeals in this case violated Mark's constitutional right to a fair trial 
before an impartial jury. Although Mark did not specifically object to the instruction, 
contrary to the State's claim (Resp't Br., p.23), he did not acquiesce to it either. Because 
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counsel did not object to the district court advising jurors of Mark's prior trial, conviction 
and appellate proceedings, the error is to fimdamental error V, 
151 Idaho 576,588 (2011); State v. Peny, 150 Idaho 209,228 (2010). 
By framing the issue as jurors' knowledge of Mark's prior trial, rather than jurors' 
knowledge of Mark's prior trial and prior guilt verdict, the State claims Mark has failed 
to cite any cases where a court found a constitutional violation that required reversal of a 
conviction. To the contrary, other courts have recognized jurors' knowledge that the 
defendant was previously found guilty of the same offense for which he is now on trial is 
so prejudicial as to constitute a denial of a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 
See. e.g.. Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d I 034, 1044-46 (Del. I 985) (holding jurors' 
knowledge of defendant's prior trial and conviction for same offense, which was 
discussed among jurors prior to deliberations, raised a presumption of jury bias that 
violated the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury); State v. Lee, 346 So. 2d 682, 
683-85 (La. 1977) ("When a jury is informed by the state that the accused was convicted 
of the crime on a previous occasion, the defendant's right to a fair trial, protected by both 
the federal and state constitutions, has been violated."). 5 See also, e.g., Fullwood v. Lee, 
290 F.3d 663, 682-83 ( 4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing, in dicta, that a violation of the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury trial may occur if the jury learned 
the defendant had previously been found guilty of murder and sentenced to death). But cf 
State v. Dunlap. 155 Idaho 345, 366 (2013) (holding sentencing jurors' knowledge that 
district court previously imposed death sentence in same case was not error). 
5Compare State v. Williams, 445 So. 2d 1171, 1177 (La. 1984) (holding prosecutor's 
remarks and elicitation of testimony referencing defendant's prior trial, but not his prior 
conviction, was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial). 
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Other courts that have dealt with this issue, although not asked to on 
constitutional grounds, have agreed that while a fleeting to a 
prior trial is a relatively minor error that can be cured with an instruction, a reference to 
the outcome of a former trial is so extraordinarily prejudicial that it will typically require 
a new trial. See, e.g., Arthur v. Bordenkircher, 715 F.2d 118, 118-20 (4th Cir. 1983) 
("[W]e are hard pressed to think of anything more damning to an accused than 
information that a jury had previously convicted him for the crime charged." (internal 
quotes omitted)); United States v. Attell, 655 F.2d 703, 704-05 (5 th Cir. 1981) (holding 
pretrial publicity which reported the defendant had previously been convicted of the 
charged offense required reversal of the defendant's conviction); Frazier v. State, 632 So. 
2d 1002, 1007 (Ala. Ct. App. 1993) ("The appellant asserts that the prosecutor committed 
reversible error when he referred to the appellant's previous conviction for the offense for 
which he was being tried. We must agree.")6; Williams v. State, 629 P.2d 54, 58-60 
(Alaska 1981) (holding trial court erred in denying the defense's motion for a mistrial 
following prosecutor's statement that defendant's prior jury trial for the same offense was 
hung 11 to I); Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d I 069, 1076-77 (Del. 1987) ("The jury not only 
learned that the defendant had been previously tried for the same charge, but that the 
1980 trial had ended in a conviction. That information, regardless of how it is received, is 
inherently prejudicial and even more so when a jury is exposed to those facts during 
trial."); Duque v. State, 498 So. 2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding where 
newspaper article published during the defendant's trial reported the defendant had been 
6Compare Sneed v. State, 1 So. 3d 104, 114-15 (Ala. Ct. App. 2007) (holding where 
"none of the references to a first trial or to prior proceedings specifically informed the 
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convicted at her first trial, the trial court's refusal to grant defense counsel's motion to 
about was reversible error)7; Hood v. State, 788, 
(Ga. App.2000) (holding prosecutor brought up the defendant's prior trial 
but not the prior guilty verdict, the trial court's curative instructions on the matter \Vere 
sufficient); People v. Jones, 528 N.E.2d 648, 658 (Ill. 1988) (holding where witness's 
testimony that she had seen particular evidence at "the last trial," did not reveal outcome 
of the prior trial and jurors were advised by the court to disregard her testimony, the brief 
remark did not prejudice the defendant or impair his right to a fair trial)8; Major v. 
Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 706, 716-17 (Ky. 2009) (holding witness's testimony 
referring briefly to prior trial, but not the outcome, when coupled with the trial court's 
admonition to disregard the testimony, was not prejudicial and did not warrant a mistrial); 
Coffey v. State, 642 A.2d 276, 281-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (holding experienced police 
officers' repeated testimony that the defendant had previously been tried and convicted of 
the same charges, where curative instruction served to emphasize the inadmissible 
testimony, required mistrial because it deprived the defendant of a fair trial). Cf State v. 
Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 766-67 (Ct App. 2012) (holding police officer's reference to 
prior trial and appeal in testimony did not warrant mistrial where officer did not testify 
jury that the appellant had previously been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to 
death," the references were not plain error). 
7See also Weber v. State, 501 So. 2d 1379, 1381-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) ("Courts 
which have confronted the discrete issue posed by the present case have uniformly 
concluded that the prejudice arising from the exposure of jurors to information that the 
defendant was previously convicted of the very offense for which he is on trial is so great 
that neither an ordinary admonition of the jurors nor the jurors' ritualistic assurances that 
they have not been affected by the information can overcome it."). 
8Cl l'vfcDonnell v. AfcPartlin, 736 N.E.2d 1074, 1091 (Ill. 2000) (holding brief, non-fact 
specific reference by witness to billing done "through the trial of last year," was not 
prejudicial). 
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defendant was convicted, court gave curative instruction and evidence of guilt was 
overwhelming). 
When Mark's motion to exclude references to the prior trial was discussed at 
pretrial hearings, the district court asked the prosecutor "You do agree that prior 
conviction, prior charges, prior incarceration, are not admissible?" the prosecutor 
responded, "I do, Your Honor." (11/21/07 Tr., p.36, Ls.19-21.) The district court 
affirmed, "Yeah, I do, too. I think that's a given." (Id., p.36, Ls.22-23.) During those 
same discussions about how to handle witness testimony from the prior trial, defense 
counsel suggested "the proper thing to do in that regard would be to state that at just 
state, during your previous testimony did you state the following. Rather than saying, 
during the first trial in this case did you state the following." (Id., p.102, Ls.3-7.) The 
district court agreed, acknowledging, "Mr. Lankford comes in with a presumption of 
innocence, and if the jury knows there's already been a conviction that presumption has a 
tough time having any air left." (Id., p.102, Ls.13-16.) Nevertheless, the district court 
instructed jurors that Mark had been tried for the same crimes, but that an appellate court 
reversed his conviction because he was not effectively represented. (1/28/08 Voir Dire 
Tr., p.115, Ls.6-18.) 
Contrary to the State's repeated assertions (Resp't Br., p.28), there is nothing in 
the record showing Mark "acquiesced to the district court's advisement and instruction." 
(Id.) As this Court has long recognized, "[t]he district court, a court of record speaks 
through its record." Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho 630, 634 (1967). "The acts of a court of 
record are known by its records alone and cannot be established by parol testimony, the 
court speaks only though its records, and the judge speaks only through the court." Id 
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(quoting with approval Herren v. People, 363 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Colo. 1961) (en bane)). 
Despite this, the State asks this Court to assume that despite Mark's written objection, 
the parties reached a contrary agreement to instruct jurors about his prior conviction and 
related proceedings. This Court has refused to presume fundamental enor stemming from 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct, when the only proof is a silent record, State v. Wright, 
97 Idaho 229, 233 (1975); this Court should similarly refuse to presume Mark agreed to 
tell jurors about his prior trial, conviction and related proceedings, not just from a silent 
record, but a contrary record. 
The State agrees Mark's jury was instructed he was tried in 1984 for the same 
crimes, but that an appeals court had decided Mark was not effectively represented in that 
trial, rendering the trial unfair. (Resp't Br., pp.30-32.) The record also clearly reflects the 
prosecutor elicited testimony during the state's case-in-chief that Mark had been on death 
row for twenty-three years for two murders in Grangeville, he was friends with guards at 
the prison, and he and Bryan were on death row together for many years. (Tr., p.1248, 
L.21 - p.1249, L.3, p.1276, Ls.9-11, p.1325, Ls.1-6, p.1323, Ls.2-10, p.1328, Ls.18-23, 
p.1328, L.24 p.1329, L.24.) 
Based on these facts, the State argues that while jurors knew of the prior trial and 
appeal in this case, jurors were not told and did not know Mark had been found guilty at 
the prior trial. (Resp't Br., p.30 ("The jury in Lankford's case was not so instructed, but 
merely advised there was a prior trial and an appellate court held his trial was unfair; 
there was no statement that he was previously found guilty.").) The State's argument is 
premised on the belief that Mark's jury was too ignorant to draw a basic and reasonable 
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inference fi:om the facts. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from 
that Mark was found guilty of the Bravences' murders. 
facts is 
Assuming the State's argument has merit, testimony that Mark was on death row 
for decades is even more prejudicial because the jury had to assume Mark was on death 
row for killing someone other than the Bravences. Where a "jury not only learns that a 
defendant has been previously tried for the same charge, but that the [prior] trial had 
ended in a conviction, [t]hat information, regardless of how it is received, is inherently 
prejudicial and even more so when a jury is exposed to those facts during trial." Bailey v. 
State, 521 A.2d at 1076-77. Here, jurors' knowledge of Mark's prior trial and conviction 
for the same offenses was inherently prejudicial, depriving Mark of his presumption of 
innocence and his constitutional right to fair trial before an impartial jury. 
The State next claims Mark's trial counsel made a strategic choice to tell jurors 
about his prior trial and convictions for the same crimes, as well his time on death row, so 
the errors Mark complains of now do not "plainly exist," thereby failing to meet the 
second prong of the fundamental error standard. First, there is no evidence such a choice 
was ever made; though the record is pregnant with counsel's expressions of concern and 
indecision on this point, indecision is neither a choice nor a decision. Moreover, even 
assuming arguendo counsel decided to tell jurors about Mark's prior trial, prior 
convictions and death sentences for the same offenses, it was objectively unreasonable. 
Strategic choices "are owed deference commensurate with the reasonableness of the 
professional judgments on which they are based." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 681 (1984). A cursory review of the case law reveals near universal condemnation 
of telling jurors about a defendant's prior trial and conviction for the same offenses; these 
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cases emphasize the inherent prejudice that results from sharing this information with 
jurors. Even if counsel decided to share this inherently prejudicial information with 
Mark's jury, the decision was objectively unreasonable. 
Finally, as the cases above reveal, telling jurors the defendant has been previously 
tried and convicted of the same charges is inherently prejudicial, affecting the base 
structure of the constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury, consistent with 
structural e1Tor. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-28 (2010) ("Where the e1Tor in 
question is a constitutional violation found to constitute a structural defect, affecting the 
base structure of the trial to the point that a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function 
as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, the appellate court shall 
automatically vacate and remand."). The United States Supreme has defined structural 
e1Tor as a 
structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, 
rather than simply an eITor in the trial process itself. Without these basic 
protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle 
for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may 
be regarded as fundamentally fair. 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
Even if not deemed structural, the error in advising jurors of Mark's prior trial, 
conviction death sentence, and appeal for the same offenses, affected Mark's substantial 
rights and affected the outcome of his trial. To find Mark guilty, the jury had to credit the 
testimony of either Bryan or Lane Thomas, or both. What these witnesses lack in 
credibility, they make up for in their willingness to testify falsely when the price is right. 
Under the facts of the case, where the physical evidence could support convictions of 
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either Bryan or Mark acting alone,9 or both acting together, disclosing Mark's prior trial, 
conviction, sentence and appeal in this same case, undoubtedly affected the outcome of 
his trial. Under these circumstances, Mark's convictions must be vacated and his case 
remanded for a new trial before a fair and impartial jury. 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mark's Motion For A New Trial 
Based On The Court's Violations Of Idaho Code Section I 9-2405, Idaho's New Trial 
Statute 
Mark maintains the district court abused its discretion by allowing prior testimony 
to be read into the record, rather than requiring the State to produce the testimony anew, 
and by telling jurors about his prior trial, conviction, sentence and appeals, all of which 
were contrary to the plain language ofldaho's new trial statute. See LC. § l 9-2405. Mark 
incorporates his prior arguments here by reference. (See Appellant's Br., pp.35-45.) 
Idaho's new trial statute \,Vas adopted in 1864 and it unambiguously provides that 
"[t]he granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been 
had. All the testimony must be produced anew, and the former verdict can not be used or 
referred to either in evidence or in argument." LC. § 19-2405 (emphasis added). While 
there is no specific evidence Idaho's new trial statute was borrowed from California, this 
9 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded when it granted Mark relief, whether 
Mark or Bryan, individually or collectively, killed the Bravences is not decided by the 
physical evidence. 
Although there is overwhelming evidence that one or both of the Lankford 
brothers killed the Bravences, only Bryan's testimony singled out Mark as 
the killer. There were no witnesses to the murder, and no murder weapon 
was admitted into evidence. There was no forensic or circumstantial 
evidence suggesting that Mark, rather than Bryan, beat the victims to 
death. 
Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578, 586-87 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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has acknowledged much of Idaho's territorial law was. 10 State v. Lundhigh, 30 
Idaho 365, 1 P. 690, 691 (1917), overruled on other grounds State v. 57 
Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156, 160 (1937). Generally, when the Idaho Legislature borrows 
another state's statute, this Court presumes it knew of the other state's existing 
interpretations, and intended Idaho's interpretations to be the same. Doggett v. 
Electronics Corp. of Am., Combustion Control Div., 93 Idaho 26, 29 (1969); State v. 
Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 87 P.2d 454, 457 (1939) ("This court, in conformity with the 
general rule, has held that a statute adopted from another state is usually, though not 
conclusively, construed in accordance with the decisions of the courts of that state 
rendered prior to its adoption herein if their interpretation is reasonable." ( citations 
omitted)). 
The presumption of parity of interpretation does not apply when the borrowed 
statute has yet to be interpreted by the lending state's highest court. As this Court 
recognized in Lundhigh, the California Supreme Court's interpretation of a statute after 
Idaho adopted the statute "might be persuasive, but would not be binding upon this 
court." 164 P. at 691 ( citation omitted). Nine years after Idaho adopted its new trial 
statute, the California Supreme Court interpreted its own new trial statute for the first 
time and concluded that "(t]o prove what a witness swore to on a former trial is 
producing the testimony anew, and is not using or referring to the former verdict in any 
sense." People v. Devine, 46 Cal. 45, 48 (1873). The California Supreme Court's 
'
0Idaho originally consisted of all of Idaho, Montana, and most of Wyoming. 2015 Idaho 
House Concurrent Resolution No. 15, State Affairs Committee, 63 rd Legislature, first 
regular session (recognizing Idaho's 125th anniversary of statehood and the creation of 
the territory of Idaho on March 4, 1863) (last accessed on September 21, 2015 at 
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/ legislation/2015/HCR0 15 .pdf). 
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interpretation of its own statute nearly a decade after Idaho borrowed it is 
in deciding what Idaho's new trial statute means. 
nominal 
Nevertheless, the State argues the California Supreme Court's interpretation of its 
own statute is the only proper way for this Court to interpret Idaho's statute; the State's 
argument ignores contrary decisions in other jurisdictions, and ignores similar statutes 
which allow for admission of prior testimony only because of explicit statutory language, 
which Idaho's statute lacks. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Mazurek v. District Court {~{Twentieth 
Judicial Dist., 22 P.3d 166, 169 (Mont. 2000) (recognizing that prior statutory language 
requiring testimony to be produced anew would preclude use of testimony from an earlier 
trial in a new trial of the same case); 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 95l(A) (Westlaw through 
September 1, 2015) ( explicitly providing that when a new trial is ordered, all "testimony 
must be produced anew except of witnesses who are absent from the state or dead, in 
which even the evidence of such witnesses on the former trial may be presented .... "). 
Moreover, because Idaho adopted its new trial statute at a time when its territory included 
Montana and most of Wyoming, the Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of the same 
statutory language, as cited above, which is consistent with Mark's reading of the statute, 
is far more persuasive than that of the California Supreme Court. 
The State then argues Mark's interpretation of section 19-2405 cannot be 
reconciled with section 9-206, which provides that: 
[t]he testimony of a witness who testified at the trial in an action or 
proceeding in any district court of the State of Idaho . . . shall be 
admissible at any subsequent trial between the same parties, and relating 
to the same subject matter, when such witness is deceased, absent from the 
state or otherwise unavailable or unable to testify as a witness. 
19 
9-206. State claims the conflict between the two statutes is irreconcilable, 
to disregard the 1864 new statute in 
(Resp't Br., p.40.) The State similarly argues the new trial statute 
conflicts with Rule 804(b )(1) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence (IRE), and must be 
disregarded. (Resp't Br., pp.40-41.) 
The statutes are not irreconcilable. Section 19-2405 is specific and narrow, 
applying only to new trials in criminal cases, not civil cases. In contrast, section 9-206 
purports to apply to testimony offered in any proceeding, trial or not, civil or criminal. 
Because section 19-2405 is specific and section 9-206 is general, section I 9-2405 
controls. See Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842 (1993) ("A specific statute, and by 
analogy a specific rule of civil or criminal procedure, controls over a more general statute 
when there is any conflict between the two or when the general statute is vague or 
ambiguous."). Much like Idaho Code section 9-206, IRE 804(b) governs the admissibility 
of prior testimony in any proceeding, not just trials and not just criminal cases. Thus, the 
specific and narrow language of section 19-2405 controls over the general, broad 
language of IRE 804(b )(1 ), which is virtually identical to Section 9-206. 
The rights of an accused in a criminal case are greater than any party to a civil 
lawsuit, and are constitutionally guaranteed. The federal constitution sets the floor of 
constitutional rights, not the ceiling, and states are always free to provide greater 
protections to its O\\>TI citizens. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 
74, 8 I (1980); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). Here, the Idaho Legislature 
chose to provide criminal defendants with greater protections in criminal cases when a 
new trial is granted through section 19-2405, which protects a defendant's constitutional 
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to a that is of bias or prejudice stemming from knowledge 
presumption of innocence, protects a defendant's to compel 
witnesses on his behalf and confront witnesses against him, and places the parties in the 
same position they would have been had the first, defective trial not taken place. 
Because the new trial statute is constitutionally based, and it is specific to criminal 
cases, it cannot be overruled by court rule or a non-conflicting statute. C.Y Dickerson v. 
United Stares, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) ("Afiranda [ v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),] 
announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively."). 
Although this Court has never considered the new trial provision, it should give it the 
deference it is entitled, having been part of our history since 1864. 
IV. 
The Prosecutor's Repeated References To And Elicitation Of Testimony Regarding 
Mark's Prior Bad Acts, Prior Conviction. Death Sentence And Confinement On Death 
Row Throughout The Trial, Repeatedly Calling Mark A Liar And Bolstering The State's 
Own Witnesses' Testimony In Closing Argument, And His Suppression Of Evidence 
Regarding Deals He Made For Snitch Testimony, Constitute Misconduct Entitling Mark 
To A New Trial 
Throughout Mark's trial, the prosecutor engaged m numerous instances of 
misconduct, a majority of which Mark's attorneys did not object to. The prosecutor also 
suppressed exculpatory evidence of deals he made in exchange for snitch testimony, and 
elicited false testimony from the snitches at Mark's trial. These instances of misconduct 
deprived Mark of his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial, requiring vacation 
of his convictions and a remand for a new trial. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the touchstone of due 
process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, 
not the culpability of the prosecutor." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). In 
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addition, as this Court has long acknowledged, "[w]hile our system of criminal justice is 
adversarial in nature, and the prosecutor is expected to be diligent and leave no stone 
unturned, he is nevertheless expected and required to be fair." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 
559, 571 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28 (1986) (citations 
omitted)). Moreover, prosecutorial "appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury 
through use of inflammatory tactics are impern1issible." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 
86-87 (Ct. App. 2007). 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, 
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite 
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall 
not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and 
vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is 
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to 
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or less degree, has 
confidence that these obligations, which so plainly rest upon the 
prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed. Consequently, improper 
suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions of personal 
knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they 
should properly carry none. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
Prosecutors have unchecked discretion to decide who to prosecute, when to 
prosecute, which crimes to prosecute, whether to make a plea offer, whether evidence is 
subject to disclosure under Brady, and whether to seek a death sentence. They have at 
their beck and call a standing army of investigators, process servers, and witnesses, their 
ovvn crime lab, and virtually unlimited access to criminal databases, including NCIC, 
CODIS (DNA) and fingerprint databases. What prosecutors possess in power and 
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resources, they lack in oversight. When prosecutors abuse their powers and engage m 
misconduct, it falls to the judiciary to hold them accountable. 
For reasons similar to those this Court relied upon to reject the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule in the Fourth Amendment context, this Court should 
protect the rights of the accused to due process and a fair trial by adopting a similar rule 
in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct. When this Court rejected the Supreme 
Court's adoption of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. 
Leon. 468 U.S. 897 (1984), it did so because Idaho's exclusionary rule was based on 
more than just deterring police misconduct: 
We believe that the exclusionary rule should be applied in order 
to: 1) provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to 
an unreasonable government search and/or seizure; 2) deter the police 
from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3) encourage thoroughness 
in the warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having the judiciary commit an 
additional constitutional violation by considering evidence which has been 
obtained through illegal means; and 5) preserve judicial integrity. 
State v. Guzman. 122 Idaho 981, 993 ( 1992). Similar rationales compel this Court to: 1) 
provide an effective remedy to persons whose due process and a fair trial rights have 
been violated by prosecutorial misconduct; 2) deter prosecutors from acting unlawfully to 
obtain convictions; 3) provide incentives for prosecutors to err on the side of 
constitutional behavior; 4) avoid having the judiciary commit additional constitutional 
violations by condoning prosecutorial misconduct; and 5) preserve judicial integrity, 
which serves an important societal purpose. 
[W]e are cognizant of the need to insure that the judiciary does function, 
and is perceived as functioning, in a manner consistent with the individual 
constitutional rights, both state and federal, of all \Vho appear before the 
bar of justice. While the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is 
undoubtedly to deter police misconduct, it is also true that at some point 
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V. 
the courts must simply refuse to countenance certain behavior on the 
part of law enforcement agencies. 
102 Idaho 387,391 (1981) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Mark urges this Court to provide a remedy to individuals who are 
deprived of their constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial by prosecutorial 
misconduct, and provide incentives for prosecutors to err on the side of constitutional 
behavior, by resolving close questions involving misconduct in the defense's favor, not 
the State's. 
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct During TriaL Eliciting Testimony Regarding The Prior 
Case 
Mark's prosecutor elicited testimony regarding Mark's prior trial, conviction, 
sentence and appeals, which violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair 
trial, and which was in direct violation of the district court's pretrial orders. See State v. 
Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). The State disregards Mark's argument that the 
prosecutor's misconduct violated his constitutional right to a fair trial, and claims because 
the challenged testimony merely violated the district court's order, the misconduct, if 
any, is a rule violation, not fundamental error. (Resp't Br., p.48.) Mark maintains his 
prosecutors secured a verdict based on factors other than the law, 11 evidence properly 
admitted at trial, 12 and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from that evidence. Id; 
11As explained in Issue I, supra, the jury instructions in Mark's case permitted the jury to 
find him guilty of felony murder (robbery), even if he had no intent to take the 
Bravences' property prior to their deaths. The prosecutor exploited this defect, assuring 
jurors that so long as Mark received the property while in Idaho, he was guilty of felony 
murder. 
12Given Bryan's inherent unreliability, included his admissions that he committed perjury 
on multiple occasions, the prosecutor's decision to present Bryan as a State's witness was 
arguably itself a violation of his duty to ensure the jury receives only competent 
evidence. 
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see that the reviewed a fair trial." (citations omitted)). In doing so, the prosecutor 
violated Mark's constitutional right to a fair trial. 
It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and 
that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury. They should 
not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon 
the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they transgress upon the 
rights of the accused." 
Stale v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
As this Court has noted, "As public officers, prosecutors have a duty to ensure 
that defendants receive fair trials." State v. Severson, I 4 7 Idaho 694, 715 (2009). Thus "a 
prosecutor must 'guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and 
tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced.' A prosecutor must 
also ensure that the jury receives only competent evidence." Id. (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 
Idaho 35, 44 (1903)). This duty cannot be shifted to defense counsel. 
Petitioner's right to have the jury deliberate solely on the basis of the 
evidence cannot be permitted to hinge upon a hope that defense counsel 
will be a more effective advocate for that proposition than the prosecutor 
will be in implying that extraneous circumstances may be considered. It 
was the duty of the court to safeguard petitioner's rights, a duty only it 
could have performed reliably. 
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,489 (1978) (internal citations omitted). 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the dangers of prosecutorial 
misconduct involving credibility vouching and expression of opinions about an accused's 
guilt: 
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such comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to 
the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the 
defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely 
on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's 
opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce 
the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the 
evidence. 
UnitedStatesv. Young,470U.S. l, 18-19(1985)(citationomitted). 
Here, prosecutors elicited testimony in the State's case-in-chief regarding Mark's 
prior trial, 13 his prior crimes/bad acts, 14 his prior incarceration15 and his prior death 
sentence. 16 (Tr., p.1248, L.21 p.1249, L.3, p.1276, Ls.9-11, p.1288, Ls.22-24, p.1323, 
13The prosecutor solicited testimony from Bryan, which either by the questions, or the 
reasonable responses to the questions, produced objectionable information about Mark's 
prior trial. (See, e.g., Tr., p.1329, Ls.6-7 ("And did you give this same story at Mark's 
first trial?"); Tr., p.1323, Ls.11-17 (prosecutor asking whether Bryan had testified in 
court and provided a different story about who was responsible for the Bravences' deaths, 
and whether the testimony was offered at a trial or at a hearing)). Similarly, the 
prosecutor asked Lane if Mark had told him what he was in for, if he had talked about the 
charges, and what he said about them, to 'Which Lane replied, "He said he as in - he's 
been on death row for 23 years for two murders, and that was committed in Grangeville." 
(Tr., p.1248, L.21 p.1249, L.3.) 
14When the prosecutor questioned Bryan about Mark selling a camera to their brother, 
Robert, and asked Bryan if he got any money from the sale, Bryan responded, "I didn't 
know for sure that it was actually ever money transpired. I thought maybe he might 
have just ultimately gave it to him for some drugs or something, because I remember 
there was drugs involved in it." (Tr., p.1317, Ls.7-11.) The defense objected to this 
statement and the court instructed jurors to disregard that "about the drugs." (Tr., p.1317, 
Ls.14-16.) When asked by the prosecutor what he and Mark did once they got to Sheep 
Creek Campground, Bryan responded, in part, "[U]ltimately I agreed to help be a 
watchout because he had stolen cars before and I had never stolen a car so -." (Tr., 
p.1288, Ls.20-23.) Finally, when asked why he left Texas, Bryan explained he was afraid 
of going to prison for a probation violation and "I was scared of prison because of what 
Mark told me about prison, where he had been." (Tr., p.1276, Ls. 9-11.) 
15When Bryan testified he changed his story about his involvement in the Bravences' 
deaths because he was afraid of being killed, the prosecutor asked him by who, Bryan 
responded, "Oh, by the gang members or friends of Mark." (Tr., p.1324, Ls.3-12.) When 
the prosecutor asked Bryan if he ever talked to Mark about any of the statements before 
he made them, Bryan responded, "Oh, yes. We were on death row together for a long 
time." (Tr., p.1325, Ls.1-6.) 
16See supra nn.13-15. 
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Ls.3-10, 1325, 1-6, p.1 18-23, p.1328, L.24 p.1 The State tries 
to itself from the improper testimony, claiming because it was volunteered by its 
witnesses, but not specifically sought by the prosecutor, the testimony did not constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
Although the State cites to some cases outside of Idaho for support (Resp't Br., 
p.49), none are compelling. Two are federal district court decisions where the court was 
asked to decide whether state court findings of no prosecutorial misconduct were contrary 
to Supreme Court precedent or wholly unreasonable. See Gonzales v. Rapelje, 2015 WL 
1534489, *9, *13 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (upholding state court's finding of no misconduct 
where petitioner volunteered information about the nature of his prior felony conviction 
during cross-examination by prosecutor, despite parties' stipulation to exclude such 
evidence): Ahmed v. Gibson, 2013 WL 5487033 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (holding where jury 
knew of defendant's and witness's methamphetamine use, and witness's prior 
convictions, witness's volunteered testimony that defendant had been in prison and had 
beaten her, was not prejudicial; trial court struck abuse testimony and jury acquitted 
defendant of attempted murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter, convicting him 
only of assault with a firearm). 
The State also cites United States v. Tetioukhine, 725 F.3d I, 10 (1 st Cir. 2013), 17 
arguing that the court recognized a difference between volunteered testimony and that 
which is directly elicited. Actually, Tetioukhine addressed the question of whether a 
defendant's false direct testimony opened the door to cross-examination about the 
17The State erroneously cites this case as "752 F.3d 1, 10 (1 st Cir. 2013)." (Resp't Br., 
p.49.) 
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circumstances under which he left his jewelry store job. Id at *9-* 10. The Court found it 
Id at * 10. 
Finally. two state cases cited by the one considered the 
whether a witness's improper testimony evidenced an intent by the prosecutor to provoke 
a mistrial, which would have then triggered double jeopardy protections and precluded 
retrial. State v. Santiago, 928 So. 3d 480, 481 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). The other 
case addressed whether the district court properly denied the defendant's motion for a 
mistrial based on a single statement by a police officer about the defendant's prior 
criminal history and incarceration. Moore v. State, 64 So. 3d 542, 546 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2011 ). Counsel immediately objected and moved for a mistrial; the district court denied 
the motion, but instructed jurors to disregard the statement. Id. On appeal, the court 
upheld the denial of the mistrial, finding because the statement ,vas not elicited by the 
prosecutor but was volunteered by the officer, there was no misconduct. Id. This 
conclusion is contrary to this Court's decision in State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 67 
(2011). 
In Ellington, this Court recognized that a police officer's "gratuitous and 
prejudicial response is imputed to the State, whether or not the State intended to elicit that 
response." Id. The State acknowledges Ellington, but only by footnote, arguing it does 
not apply because "(Lane] Thomas obviously was not a law enforcement officer." 
(Resp't. Br., p.49, n.8.) The State fails to address Bryan's improper testimony, or explain 
how it is not attributable to the State. 
A prosecutor has an obligation to inform state witnesses "of any subjects 
improper for testimony so that the witnesses may avoid violating an order in limine." 
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State v. Witrsell, 66 P.3d 831,839 (Kan. 2003); see also State v. Riley, 796 .W.2d 371, 
misconduct to to 
its witness to refrain from mentioning a polygraph exam, and even though the 
witness testified about the polygraph on cross-examination by the defense, "it was the 
responsibility of the State to instruct [its witness] on his obligation to comply with the 
order in limine"). Moreover, even in the absence of such an order, a prosecutor has a duty 
to guard against testimony containing inadmissible evidence. Lamb v. State, 251 P.23d 
700, 708 (Nev. 2011); People v. Warren, 754 P.2d 218, 224-25 (Cal. 1988). As the 
Kansas Supreme Court has recognized: 
Intrinsically, violations of orders in limine have a prejudicial effect 
because the requisite for obtaining such orders is showing that the mere 
offer or reference to the excluded evidence would tend to be prejudicial. 
The primary purpose of an order in limine, after all, is to prevent prejudice 
during trial. 
The importance of compliance with orders in limine has been underscored 
by our caselaw imposing a duty on prosecutors to instruct their witnesses 
about the existence and contents of such orders as a guard against 
improper testimony. 
State v. Santos-Vega, 321 P.3d 1, 11 (Kan. 2014) (citations omitted). Similarly, as this 
Court recognized in State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 144-45 (2014), \Vhen a prosecutor 
questions his own witnesses in a way which conveys inadmissible evidence to the jury, 
he commits misconduct. Specifically, a prosecutor commits misconduct when he attempts 
to skirt an order in limine through direct questioning of his own witness "by giving the 
jury more than enough information to easily infer the content of the [inadmissible 
evidence]." Id. 
The prosecutor in Mark's case had a duty to infom1 both Lane and Bryan of the 
district court's order excluding evidence of Mark's prior trial, prior incarceration, prior 
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death sentence, prior bad acts, and prior appeals. In addition, the prosecutor had a duty to 
the admission improper testimony. It does not appear the prosecutor did 
these things. 
Mark acknowledges Bryan and Lane are not and were not law enforcement 
officers when they testified against him. Nevertheless, both Bryan and Lane testified for 
the State, at the State's request, and in exchange for that testimony, they received 
personal benefits. Because snitches and their incentivized testimony are so integrally 
intertwined with prosecutors, unlike regular lay witnesses vvho receive nothing for their 
testimony, snitches are agents of the State and are more like law enforcement officers 
than lay witnesses. 
Bryan's incentive to testify for the State and say Mark killed the Bravences, not 
him, was significant: a chance at freedom. 18 Lane's incentives were equally great: 
freedom and cold, hard cash. 19 Because of the special relationship the prosecutor had 
18In exchange for his testimony, Bryan got a parole hearing seven years earlier than 
scheduled; he got testimony from a prosecutor and a police detective at his parole hearing 
about his assistance and cooperation in Mark's case; a name change; an agreement that he 
be relocated; a cellphone to keep with him, in his cell, so he could make unrecorded, 
unmonitored calls to his wife, friends, and family members; a prosecutor who facilitated 
communications between Bryan and his wife, as well as a State's witness; and, an 
agreement that he would not be prosecuted for prior perjury. 
19Lane pied guilty to felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer and was 
sentenced to serve three years, with 18 months fixed, on December 10, 2007, the district 
court retained jurisdiction for 180 days and set a review hearing for May 12, 2008. (Supp. 
R., pp.251-53.) In exchange for his "truthful" testimony against Mark, Lane received 
immunity from prosecution for his past false statements (7 /29/13 E.H. Tr., p. 72, L.18 -
p.73, L.23); he was released almost three months early from prison (Supp. R., pp.262-63) 
and placed on probation (Supp. R., pp.264-65, 693-700); as an added bonus, he got 
$1,500 in cash upon his release from jail. Lane's testimony later secured him three get 
out of jail free passes when he violated his probation on three different occasions. (8/5/13 
E.H. Tr., p.261, L.6 - p.264, L.13; Supp. R., pp.751-57 (Defs E.H. Ex.CC).) By the 
fourth violation, the prosecutor finally refused to help Lane evade prison. (8/15/13 Tr., 
p.264, Ls.14-25.) 
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Bryan and and the benefits they received in exchange for testimony 
against Mark, their incentivized testimony is attributable to the prosecutor the logic 
of Ellington, whether solicited or not. If prosecutors are not accountable their agents' 
improper testimony, and convictions are not vacated when prosecutors either actively 
elicit, or passively refuse to prevent improper testimony, prosecutors will have incentive 
to disregard their constitutional and ethical obligations. As Judge Alex Kozinski observed 
in the context of Brady violations, which he characterized as having reached "epidemic 
proportions" in recent years: 
When a public official behaves with such casual disregard for his 
constitutional obligations and the rights of the accused, it erodes the 
public's trust in our justice system, and chips away at the foundational 
premises of the rule of law. When such transgressions are acknowledged 
yet forgiven by the courts, we enforce and invite their repetition. 
United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631-32 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting 
from order denying petition for rehearing en bane); accord Stare v. Phillips, I 44 Idaho 
82, 89 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Although circumstances may arise, particularly if there is a 
pattern of repetitious misconduct by an individual prosecutor or a particular prosecutor's 
office, that would call for reversal ... despite the harmlessness of the error, we need not 
decide that question today .... "). 
The improper testimony offered through the State's snitches was highly 
prejudicial, it deprived Mark of his presumption of innocence, relieved the State of its 
Despite alleged concerns about risks to Lane's life or safety because of his 
testimony against Mark, there is no evidence Lane was harmed while serving out the 
remainder of his prison sentence. Lane completed his sentence and was discharged from 
IDOC custody on January 1, 2012. (See IDOC Offender Search, Lane Franklin Thomas, 
IDOC no. 87733 at https://vvvvw.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender _search/result, 
last accessed September 22, 2015.) According to Prosecutor Thompson, Lane's sentence 
topped out in January of 2012. (7/29/13 E.H. Tr., p.71, Ls.13-25.) 
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burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and deprived him of his right to a 
fair trial before an impartial jury. The testimony represents an attempt to secure a guilty 
verdict based on factors other than admissible evidence and the law. For these reasons, 
the misconduct committed by the prosecutor in Mark's case \Varrants a new trial. 
B, Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Argument 
Throughout closing argument, the prosecutor called Mark a liar, told jurors Mark 
lied when he testified under oath, and then vouched for the truthfulness of State 
witnesses. The State minimizes the misconduct and claims to not know the difference 
between misconduct vvhere the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of his witnesses, 
and misconduct where the prosecutor called Mark a liar and accused him of perjury.20 To 
help the State recognize the difference between these types of misconduct, Mark notes 
the following instances of prosecutorial misconduct involve improper vouching, while 
the remaining misconduct identified at pages 50-52 of his Appellant's Brief, involve the 
prosecutor calling Mark a liar and/or a perjurer: 
• ''Darrell Cox had no reason to make that up. He had no reason to lie today. 
lie was inconvenienced, I'm sure, to come in and be a witness in this case, 
but he told the truth." (Tr., p.1816, Ls.7-10 (emphasis added).) 
• ·'We've shown you good people that have come up and been honest." (Tr., 
p.1820, Ls.6-8.) 
• "Lane Thomas, basically with his life on the line, came in and testified 
in front of you. He had no reason to lie. He did not get a plea bargain 
from the State. The only thing that we agreed to do was write a letter of 
20The prosecutor's misconduct in closing argument, telling jurors Mark lied to them 
during his testimony ( committed perjury), include: (1) "So he lied to you on the stand 
when he talked about the kind of money he had when he left Texas and when he came 
back from Texas." (Tr., p.1817, Ls.11-14); (2) "Mark Lankford testified in this case, and 
there was [sic] many lies that he told you." (Tr., p.1815, Ls.18-19); and (3) "I find it 
strange that these people he allegedly says gave him an alibi defense have never been 
found .... I submit that there is nobody that gave him a ride, and that that's a made-up 
story. That's another of his lies." (Tr., p.1835, Ls.1-16). 
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cooperation that if he testified I would vvrite a letter saying he came in and 
told the truth. And that I would send that to Judge on his case to 
facility in Cottonwood where what they 
1 1-10 (emphasis added).) 
• overwhelming evidence is, one, the testimony of Lane Thomas that 
puts Mark Lankford there. A credible person that puts him there. Mark 
Lankford's confession to him." (Tr., p.1833, Ls.14-18 (emphasis added).) 
• 'Td ask you to think about Lane Thomas' testimony. I think we had a 
person there that didn't want to be here. He said he said he didn't want 
to be here. He said that his life had been threatened by Mr. Lankford and 
that his life had been hell since he got involved in this case. Yet, even 
facing that he came in and testified for nothing, nothing except a 
letter. And I submit he told the truth about Mark Lankford's confession 
to him. about him being there with Bryan Lankford and participating in 
these murders." (Tr., p.1839, Ls.9-18 (emphasis added).) 
Prosecutors commit misconduct in closing argument when they make comments 
"so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have been 
remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should be 
disregarded." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003) (quoting State v. Cortez, 135 
Idaho 561, 565 (Ct. App. 2001)). This Court has acknowledged a prosecutor cannot 
express his personal belief about a witness's credibility in closing argument, unless the 
argument is based solely on inferences from the trial evidence. State v. Dunlap, 155 
Idaho 345, 369 (2013). A "prosecuting attorney may express an opinion in argument as to 
the truth or falsity of testimony or the guilt of the defendant when such opinion is based 
upon the evidence," but "when such a comment is contemplated the prosecutor should 
exercise caution to avoid interjecting his personal belief and should explicitly state that 
the opinion is based solely on inferences from evidence presented at trial." State v. 
Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 753 n. l (1991 ), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 
Idaho 425, 432 (1991 ). Prosecutors should avoid statements of opinion, including "I 
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think" and "I believe" altogether. State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho l 131 (Ct App. 
1986). 
Despite overwhelming volume of misconduct, the State the prosecutors 
did not vouch for their own witnesses, and did not improperly call Mark a liar, but simply 
commented on the evidence in closing argument. (Resp't Br., pp.55-59.) And even if the 
prosecutor did commit misconduct, and the misconduct violated Mark's constitutional 
rights, the State claims Mark's attorneys could have had a strategic reason for not 
objecting.21 Given the prejudicial nature of the repeated misconduct, even if Mark's 
attorneys could identify a strategic reason for failing to object, it would be objectively 
unreasonable and unworthy of this Court's deference. 
Finally, the State retreats to its standard response: the evidence of Mark's guilt 
was overwhelming, thus rendering the misconduct harmless. The State fails to identify 
the overwhelming evidence of Mark's guilt upon which its argument rests because it 
cannot; there is no overwhelming evidence of Mark's guilt. "Where the issue of guilt is 
debatable or it appears from the record that the jurors could have reasonably entertained 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt and that misconduct of the prosecuting attorney might 
well have influenced the result, a conviction will be reversed." State v. Spencer, 74 Idaho 
173, 184 (1953). 
No instruction from the district court could undo the volume of misconduct in 
closing argument. The State asked jurors to convict Mark not because the admissible 
evidence of his guilt was strong-it was not-but by inflaming jurors' passions against 
21 If the State claims the strategic basis was defense counsels' reluctance to object during 
closing argument, it is sorely mistaken. Defense counsel repeatedly objected during the 
prosecutor's closing argument. (See Tr., p.1822, Ls.3, 7, 12, p.1831, L.17, p.1835, L.19.) 
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him and appealing to their emotions by characterizing him as a liar and a perjurer, while 
characterizing its own including the most 
unreliable ones, as saints. 
The prosecutor and defense "have traditionally been afforded considerable 
latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, 
from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be 
drmvn therefrom." Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969. Despite this 
wide latitude, "appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury 
through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible." State v. Ellington, 
151 Idaho 53, 62,253 P.3d 727, 736 (2011) (quoting State v. Phillips. 144 
Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007)). The Court has 
recognized, however, that "[t]he line separating acceptable from improper 
advocacy is not easily drawn; there is often a gray zone." State v. Carson, 
151 Idaho 713,721,264 P.3d 54, 62 (2011). "[P]rosecutorial misconduct 
during closing arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the 
comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent 
prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court 
informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded." Sheahan, 
139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 
Cortez, 135 Idaho 561,565, 21 P.3d 498,502 (Ct. App. 2001)). 
State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146 (2014); see also State v. Spencer, 74 Idaho 173, 184 
( 1953) ("Where the issue of guilt is debatable or it appears from the record that the jurors 
could have reasonably entertained doubt as to the defendant's guilt and that misconduct of 
the prosecuting attorney might well have influenced the result a conviction will be 
reversed." (citations omitted)). 
To suggest the prosecutor was simply pointing out inconsistencies between 
Mark's testimony and that of other witnesses, or just commenting on the strength of the 
defense's evidence (Resp't Br., p.59), is absurd. The prosecutor engaged in misconduct to 
secure a conviction in a case with nominal evidence of guilt; the prejudice resulting from 
that misconduct could not have remedied by instructions from the court advising jurors to 
disregard it. 
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Prosecutorial Misconduct In Rebuttal Closing Argument 
proceedings, State sought information regarding Mark's alibi. 
expressed frustration about providing this information, telling the State 
and the district court that "one of the problems I'm having is I don't know exactly when 
the Bravences were killed, and if the State could tell me exactly when that happened then 
I might be able to say, number one." (1/10/08 Hrg. Tr., p.191, Ls.5-9.) In response, 
prosecutor MacGregor represented to the court and defense counsel, "And, Your Honor, 
we do know basically that the murders occurred around dark, around 9: 15, 9:00 in the 
evening .... On June 21st, 1983." (Id, p.192, Ls.17-21.) Prosecutor Albers also chimed in: 
"About 9: 15, longest day of the year at approximately 9: 15 just at dark, June 21 st 1983." 
(Id, p.192, Ls.24-25.) The trial court and defense counsel accepted the prosecutors at 
their word. (Id., p.193, Ls.1-3.) 
At no point during the trial, or during closing argument, did prosecutors 
backpedal from the time of the Bravences' deaths. Instead, prosecutor Albers waited until 
rebuttal closing argument, when Mark had no ability to respond, to move the Bravences' 
time of death from 9:00 or 9: 15, to 8:30 p.m. (Tr., p.1877, Ls.1-4 ("In order for the 
Lankfords to get to Pendleton, ... the deaths have to occur about 8:30.").) The prosecutor 
then summarized Bryan's story of the evening of June 21 51, and contrasted it with Mark's 
testimony, arguing because the Bravences died at 8:30 p.m., and Bryan's story was 
consistent with that timeframe but Mark's was not, Bryan was telling the truth. (Tr., 
p.1877, L.1 - p.1879, L.12.) Defense counsel objected: "Your Honor, I'm going to 
object. They asked an [sic] abili defense at 9: 15 p.m. that night and they are getting up 
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and argumg that it was at 8:30." (Tr., p.1879, Ls.13-15.) The court overruled the 
objection. (Tr., 1879, L.16.) 
It is improper to misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence in 
closing argument. Rothwell, 154 Idaho at 133, 294 P.3d at 1145. Indeed, 
the prosecutor "has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the facts and 
unnecessarily inflammatory tactics." State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166, 
610 P.2d 522, 525 (1980) (overruled on other grounds by State v. LePage, 
102 Idaho 387, 630 P.2d 674 (1981)). Here, the prosecutor fell short of 
that standard by claiming, without qualification that Branam could not 
"get in trouble" for his testimony at Moses' preliminary hearing. The 
immunity agreement is clear that Branam could be prosecuted for false 
testimony; claiming otherwise was a misrepresentation. 
State v. 1\lfoses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014). Because counsel objected to the misconduct, 
the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the misconduct did not contribute to the 
jury's verdict. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-28 (2010). 
The State argues prosecutors were not bound by their pretrial representations 
regarding the victims' time of death, and because the new time of death could be 
supported by evidence elicited at trial, there was no misconduct and no due process 
violation. (Resp't Br., pp.62-63.) Although this Court has not specifically addressed the 
misconduct at issue here, it has recognized the State violates due process when it argues 
inconsistent theories at the core of its case against two or more defendants accused of the 
same crime. State v. Payne, l 46 Idaho 548, 566 (2008) ( citations omitted). Moreover, this 
Court has recognized the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents parties from assuming 
inconsistent positions in the same case. 
If parties in court were permitted to assume inconsistent positions in the 
trial of their causes, the usefulness of courts of justice would in most cases 
be paralyzed; the coercive process of the law, available only between 
those who consented to its exercise, could be set at naught by all. But the 
rights of all men, honest and dishonest, are in the keeping of the courts, 
and consistency of proceeding is therefore required of all those who come 
or are brought before them. It may accordingly be laid down as a broad 
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proposition that one who, without mistake induced by the opposite party, 
has taken a particular position deliberately in the course of litigation, must 
act consistently with it; one cannot play fast and loose. 
TVinmark v. Miles & Stockbridge, 674 A.2d 73, 79-80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) 
(additional citation omitted)22 (quoted with approval in ,McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 
153 (1997)). As this Court noted in }\1cKay, "Judicial estoppel is meant to prevent taking 
inconsistent positions, whether legal or factual, at least absent newly discovered evidence 
or fraud." 130 Idaho at 155. Neither newly discovered evidence nor fraud justify the 
State's inconsistent factual positions. 
The State fails to explain how the prosecutor taking inconsistent factual positions 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument 
stated, as fact, that the victims were killed at 8:30 p.m., a half-hour to 45 minutes earlier 
than prosecutors represented to the court and defense counsel. When prosecutors 
represented to the defense and the trial court that the victims died at 9:00 p.m. or 9: 15 
p.m., it did so to obtain specific alibi information from the defense. When prosecutors 
changed the time of the victims' deaths in rebuttal closing argument, it did so to support 
Bryan's testimony, which was necessary to try to convince jurors to believe the State's 
case (i.e., Bryan's version of events), while casting doubt on Mark's testimony. 
(Compare Tr., p.1287, L.4 -p.1306, L.10 with Tr., p.1594, L.19- p.1623, L.23.) In both 
instances, the State had something to gain from taking inconsistent positions. Because 
this case is truly a matter of they said versus he said, Lan¾ford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578, 
22The Winmark decision was vacated by the Maryland Court of Appeals, which found the 
Court of Special Appeals erroneously applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel. See 
WinA1ark Ltd. Partnership v. livfiles & Stockbridge, 693 A.2d 824, 831 (Md. Ct. App. 
1997) (holding Court of Special Appeals improperly applied judicial estoppel against the 
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589 Cir. 2006) (observing that the corroborative evidence in Mark's case implicates 
the Lankfords generally, not Mark specifically, and there is no unique evidence that 
points to rather than Bryan, as the perpetrator), absent the State's 
misconduct, "honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty 
verdicts.'' Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1967). Thus, Mark's convictions 
and sentence must be vacated, and his case remanded for a new trial because the State 
cannot prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutor's misconduct did not 
contribute to his convictions. 
D. Prosecutorial Misconduct For Bradv23 And Napue2 -1 Violations 
The prosecutors below engaged in serious misconduct which violated Mark's 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The State gained its convictions against Mark 
by suppressing material, exculpatory evidence about deals it made in exchange for snitch 
testimony, 25 and by presenting testimony it knew to be false. On appeal, the State 
petitioners, vacating judgment and remanding the matter to the Court of Special Appeals 
for further consideration). 
23 Brady v. Maryland, 3 73 U.S. 83 (1963 ). 
2\Vapue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 
25The dangers associated with snitch testimony are obvious but bear repeating. As Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals' Judge Stephen Trott has explained on multiple occasions: 
The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who claims 
another prisoner has confessed to him. The snitch now stands ready to 
testify in return for some consideration in his own case. Sometimes these 
snitches tell the truth, but more often they invent testimony and stray 
details out of the air: In the seamy world of jailhouse informers, treachery 
has long been their credo and favors from jailers their reward. 
Honorable Stephen S. Trott, Word-; of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as 
Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 1381, 1394 (1996); see also Russell Covey, 
Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, 49 WAKE FOREST LAW REV. 1375 (2014) 
(arguing for a complete ban on jailhouse snitch testimony absent corroboration through 
recording of any alleged confession/admission by a defendant, because: (1) such 
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incorrectly claims that when denying Mark's motion for a new trial, the court found no 
violations occmTed, and further claims Mark has failed to show either a Brady or 
arguments regarding the State's Brady and Napue violations, 
including applicable case law, are set forth in his Appellant's Brief and incorporated here 
(See Appellant's Br., pp. 54-72.) 
1. Lane's Undisclosed Deal With The State And His False Testimony26 
When Lane testified for the State on February 8, 2008, he declared he was "pretty 
close" to finishing the sixth month rider program. 27 (Tr., p.1246, Ls.4-15.) This was a lie. 
Lane started the program on December 26, 2007; by the time he testified, he was only 
about six weeks into the six month program, not "pretty close" to finishing. 28 (Supp. R., 
pp.251-53 (Defendant's E.H. Ex.S).) Lane also testified he did not receive a plea bargain 
for his testimony, and the prosecutor's office "did nothing to get me here to testify." (Tr., 
testimony is so inherently biased; (2) the temptations faced by inmates to commit perjury 
arc overwhelming; (3) jurors are inclined to give snitch testimony more value than it is 
worthy of; and ( 4) current devices, like cross-examination and post-conviction relief, are 
ineffective in ferreting out unreliable informant testimony); Northwestern University 
School of Law, Center on Wrongful Convictions, The Snitch System: How Snitch 
Testimony Sent Randy Steidl and Other Innocent Americans to Death Row (Winter 2004-
2005) (documenting how incentivized testimony of jailhouse witnesses who were 
promised leniency in their own cases, or killers with incentive to cast suspicions away 
from themselves, contributed to 45.9% of the 111 death row exonerations to date) (last 
accessed at http://vvww.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/SnitchSystem 
Booklet.pdf on September 18, 2015)). 
26Incredibly, the State tries to argue Mark's claim is limited to the State's failure to tell 
the defense about its agreement to help Lane get out of prison and on probation. (Resp't 
Br., p.66, n.9.) The State's argument is belied by Mark's Appellant's Brief. (Appellant's 
Br., pp.58-66.) 
27The prosecutor asked Lane, "Okay, and you're serving six months over there?" Lane 
responded, "Yes, sir." The prosecutor then asked, "Are you about done with that 
firogram?" Lane responded, "Pretty close, sir." (Tr., p.1246, Ls.11-15.) 
8That is, unless the prosecutors in Mark's case told Lane they had reached an agreement 
with prosecutor Thompson in Latah County to secure his release from prison upon 
Mark's conviction. 
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p.1254, Ls.16-21.) This was also a lie. Lane later admitted that in exchange for his 
testimony, the prosecutor's office would write a letter of cooperation to the prison telling 
them he had testified truthfully, and had cooperated in the investigation of Mark's case. 
(Tr., p.1257, Ls.4-22.) Even this was a lie by omission. The prosecutor also promised to 
grant Lane immunity from prosecution for his prior statements, and also promised to try 
to get Lane out of prison and placed on probation.29 Lane also testified the prosecutor did 
not offer him anything, including the letter of cooperation, until the day before he 
testified. (Tr., p.1262, L.14 - p.1263, L.17.) This is also a lie. (7/29/13 E.H. Tr., p.32, 
L.15-p.33, L.17, p.68, L.12-p.69, L.4, p.70, L.6 -p.72, L.24; 8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.240, 
L.22 - p.244, L.12.) 
Finally, Lane was asked if, other than the promised letter of cooperation, there 
was any other reason that he was testifying against Mark. (Tr., p.1259, Ls.20-22.) Lane 
responded, "There's no reason but just being honest." (Tr., p.1259, L.23.) This was also a 
lie. The prosecutor promised that he would talk to Lane's prosecutor (in fact, he already 
had talked to Lane's prosecutor a month or so prior to Mark's trial) and judge, try to get 
Lane out of prison early and placed on probation, and grant him immunity from 
prosecution for his prior false statements. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p. 241, L.4 - p.242, L.9, 
p.244, L.6 - p.245, L.19, p.248, L.2 - p.249, L.5, p.249, Ls.17-19.) Moreover, upon 
Lane's early release from prison, Skott Mealer, the lead detective on Mark's case (id, 
p.183, Ls.11-14), cashed a $1,500 check from Idaho County payable to him, and then 
29Lane testified that he hoped to be placed on probation after the rider, not during. (Tr., 
p.1260, L 4 -p.1261, L.4.) 
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clandestinely passed the $1,500 cash to Lane30 behind a car wash, in a manner more 
befitting of a drug deal 31 than legitimate State business. 
Despite contrary testimony from State witnesses,32 the district court below 
concluded Lane was paid $1,500 not for travel expenses, but "in the same manner that 
sums are paid to informants." (Supp. R., p.903.) In addition, the court concluded Lane's 
30The State maintains that if there was no agreement to pay Lane prior to trial, "that's not 
a Brady violation. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.154, Ls.23-25, p.155, Ls.3-7.) All inducements to 
testify, including the wink and the nod of implied future benefits not reduced to a formal 
agreement, are subject to disclosure under Brady. See R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words 
Of Hope:" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, And The Problem Ollmplied Inducements, 98 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1129,passim (Spring 2004). 
31 Detective Mealer testified he got a radio or phone call on the morning of March 3, 
2008, from an unknown person (8/5/14 E.H. Tr., p.172, Ls.8-19), telling him to go to the 
Idaho County Courthouse to meet with County Commission Doman about a check for 
Lane. (Id, p.168, L.10 p.170, L.7.) Detective Mealer immediately went to the 
courthouse and got a check for $1,500 from Commissioner Doman. (Id., p.170, L. 7 -
p.171, L.23.) Detective Mealer testified that when he paid informants, he typically paid 
them in cash. (Id., p.173, Ls.2-20.) Detective Mealer testified "[s]omebody had told me to 
to meet him [Lane] up on 21 st by a a car wash behind, I want to say, Rosauers. But, 
again, I don't - I don't recall that. But I did meet him, and it was by a car wash up on 2 I st 
Street later that day." (Id., p.174, Ls.2-7.) As soon as he cashed the check, he 
immediately drove his county vehicle to Lewiston, where he met Lane "behind a car 
wash in - on 21 st Street." (Id., p.175, Ls.2-13, p.178, Ls.3-4.) Lane testified he was told 
by Detective Mealer to meet the detective behind the car wash on 21 st in Lewiston after 
he got out of jail. (8/6/13 E.H. Tr., p.428, Ls.8-18.) 
32Dennis Albers, the lead prosecutor against Mark and Bryan Lankford in 1983-1984, 
was the deputy prosecutor in Mark's 2008 trial. (7/29/13 E.H. Tr., p.7, Ls.5-21.) He 
testified the $1,500 was travel money for Lane to get out of town and go to Texas. (Id, 
p.35, L.21 -p.37, L.12, p.41, Ls.4-7, p.56, L.23 -p.57, L.18.) Prosecutor Albers thought 
the amount was too high for travel, but "it was probably reasonable in view of the benefit 
that he had been to the State and to get him away from Mark Lankford." (Id., p.45, Ls.1-
6, 14-21.) Latah County Prosecutor Bill Thompson also testified about the $1,500. 
Thompson testified Lane's Latah County case was set for an early review hearing on 
February 29, 2009. (7/29/13 E.H.Tr., p.63, L.11 - p.65, L. 1.) At that hearing, Lane was 
released from prison and placed on probation; it was contemplated that he would go to 
Texas and be on unsupervised probation. (Id, p.65, Ls.6-13.) Thompson testified the 
$1,500 payment was discussed at the hearing, and that McGregor and Albers were going 
to ask their commissioners to give Lane $1500 to defray costs ofrelocating to Texas. (Id., 
p.76, Ls.9 -21.) 
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trial testimony regarding the benefits he got for testifying against Mark was not false, but 
the prosecutor did not tell the defense about its agreement to try to Lane out of 
pnson (Supp. R., pp.901-902.) Both cannot be true. 
Rather than acknowledging the failures of its brethren to meet their constitutional 
obligations, the State defends the prosecutors' nondisclosure, and minimizes the import 
of the undisclosed evidence, characterizing it as cumulative impeachment and nothing 
more than "minute details." (Resp't Br., pp.70-71.) Additionally, the State claims Lane 
"was forced to endure" extensive impeachment through cross-examination, and therefore, 
even if he did testify falsely, the false testimony was cumulative because he \Vas so 
extensively impeached. (Id., p.72.) It is unclear which cross-examination the State relies 
on for this statement, as it cites none; given the limited cross-examination and 
impeachment of Lane at Mark's trial, it cannot be this case. (See Tr., p.1260, L.4 -
p.1270, L.24.) 
Lane testified the prosecutor's letter of cooperation, the State's agreement not to 
prosecute him for perjury for his prior statements, and because he was just being honest, 
were his only inducements to testify against Mark. What the jury did not hear was that 
Mark's prosecutors had met with Lane's prosecutor a month before Mark's trial and had 
already made arrangements for Lane to get released from prison, so long as his testimony 
inculpated Mark. The jury also did not hear that once Mark was convicted, the 
prosecutors were going to get Lane out of prison three months early, on unsupervised 
probation. Jurors also did not know that Lane got $1,500 in cash for his testimony. The 
reason the jury did not know this information is because the prosecutor allowed Lane's 
false testimony regarding the scope of the prosecutor's agreement with him to go 
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uncorrected, 
State's 
the prosecutor failed to tell the defense about all the benefits it 
his testimony. 
to minimize the benefits Lane received for 
testimony and the impact that information would have had on Lane's credibility before 
the jury, had the State disclosed it, is unavailing, The suppression of the prosecutor's deal 
with Lane to testify against Mark, and the prosecutor's decision to allow Lane's false 
testimony about that deal to go uncorrected, left the jury not only with incomplete 
information upon which to judge Lane's credibility and the credibility of his story about 
Mark's alleged confession to him, but false information about Lane's deal with the 
prosecutor and incentive to testify. 
2. Prosecution's Undisclosed Deal With Brvan And Elicitation Of False 
Testimonv 
Bryan is a professional perjurer. By his o,vn admissions, he lies under oath in 
open court, and he lies in sworn statements and affidavits filed with the courts. Bryan lies 
to get what he wants. His perjured testimony in Mark's trial, followed by yet another 
recantation, is unremarkable and should come as no surprise to anyone who knows him, 
or knows of him. However, Bryan's penchant for perjury may not be as obvious to jurors 
who have no prior involvement with him; they may have accepted his explanations for 
his past history of perjury and false statements. As a result, evidence of Bryan's 
willingness to lie, if only by omission, about benefits he received from the prosecutor for 
his testimony, was important evidence of Bryan's continued willingness to lie and 
commit perjury when it suits his needs. 
At Mark's trial, Bryan testified about the deals he was getting in exchange for his 
testimony, which were numerous; however, he failed to mention having a cell phone in 
44 
his jail cell, and to having prosecutor MacGregor at his disposal to facilitate 
him and his brother, 
prosecutor allowed the omissions to go uncorrected, even though the 
had walked Bryan through every other benefit the State had given him to 
testify against Mark when Bryan was struggling to remember them all. (Tr., p.1329, L.21 
- p.1335, L.18.) The prosecutor stated, in his questioning of Bryan, "Do you remember if 
- just want to make sure we get all these conditions down regarding what you've been 
offored by the Prosecutor." (Tr., p.1334, Ls.21-23.) After Bryan admitted to additional 
promises for his testimony, the prosecutor asked, "Is there any other reasons why you're 
testifying today?" (Id, p.1336, Ls.4-5.) When Bryan responded, "Absolutely," the 
prosecutor asked "[a]ny personal reasons?" (Id, p.1336, L.7.) When Bryan began to offer 
his inadmissible opinion, the defense objected and the objection was sustained. (Id., 
p.1336, Ls.9-14.) The prosecutor said he was finished questioning Bryan, but never asked 
him about the rest of the benefits the State gave him for testifying. The State ignores the 
Napue violations resulting from the prosecutor's elicitation of incomplete testimony from 
Bryan about the benefits he received for his testimony, knowing that its incomplete 
nature rendered it false, if only by omission. 
33The district court concluded Bryan's failure to reveal the prosecutor provided him with 
access to a cellphone during his testimony about benefits he was receiving in exchange 
for his testimony was not perjured because '·Bryan was never asked about such access nor 
asked generally about any jail house privileges." (Supp. R., p.910.) This view toward 
suppressed exculpatory evidence has been disavowed by the United States Supreme 
Court: "A rule thus declaring 'prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,' is not tenable 
in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process." Banks v. Dretke, 
540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004). The court did not address the prosecutor's facilitation of 
pretrial communications between Bryan and Lee John, or communications between 
Bryan and his wife, Francoise. 
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the State focuses on the Brady violation stemming from prosecutors' 
failure to defense counsel that it facilitated Bryan a cellphone he was in 
to during Mark's 35 and failing to tell defense counsel that it 
facilitated communications between Bryan and another State's witness, as well as his 
,vife.36 The State claims that this suppressed evidence was not material because the jury 
was already a,vare of Bryan's history of false statements and perjury, and even if the 
communications were additional consideration for his testimony, they "would have been 
nothing more than a feather laid upon a stack of bricks that had already repeatedly 
challenged every aspect of his retrial testimony." (Resp't Br., p.75.) The State's argument 
is essentially that Bryan's lack of credibility excused it from its constitutional obligation 
to disclose exculpatory evidence. That is, no matter how great the undisclosed 
impeachment evidence was, it was in-elevant because nothing could diminish Bryan's 
credibility further. This is the same conclusion the district court reached in rejecting 
Mark's motion for a new trial. (Supp. R., p.912.) 
While the State downplays the relevance and significant of Bryan's possession of 
a cellphone in his jail cell for the 3-4 months prior to and during Mark's trial, it is worth 
noting that Idaho law now makes the unauthorized or unlawful possession of a cellphone 
34Detective Mealer testified prosecutor MacGregor asked him to get Bryan a cellphone 
while he was in the county jail. (E.H. Tr., p.188, L.11 - p.189, L.4, p.194, L.25 p.195, 
L2.) 
35The district court concluded the State suppressed this evidence below in violation of 
Brady, (Supp. R., pp.911-12.) 
36Lee John is Mark's and Bryan's brother. Lee John testified for the State against Mark 
and corroborated aspects of Bryan's testimony regarding a purple club Mark owned and 
which Bryan claimed Mark used to assault the Bravences. (Tr., p.1500, L.8 - p.1521, 
L. 13.) The fact that the prosecutor facilitated communications between Bryan and Lee 
John prior to trial would have been devastating to Lee John's testimony, Bryan's 
testimony and the prosecutor's credibility before the jury. 
46 
in a jail or other correctional facility a felony punishable by up to five years in prison and 
a $10,000 fine. 37 § 18-2510(3)(c), (4), (5)(b), (5)(c), LC. § 18-101 1). The State 
not bother to address Mark's claims regarding its suppression of evidence that the 
prosecutor facilitated pretrial communications between Bryan and Lee John, a State 
witness, as well as communications between Bryan and his wife, Francoise. 
For the reasons explained here and in his Appellant's Brief, the Brady violations 
stemming from the State's failure to disclose the deals it made with Lane and Bryan, in 
exchange for their testimony against Mark, prejudiced Mark. There is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence of the deals prosecutors made in exchange for snitch 
testimony been disclosed to the defense, the result of the trial would have been different. 
The only evidence specifically identifying Mark rather than Bryan as the Bravences' 
killer, \Vas the testimony of Lane and Bryan. The more evidence the defense had to 
discredit their testimony, including the incentives they had to testify against Mark, the 
less weight jurors would have given to their testimony; evidence of the undisclosed plea 
deals undermines confidence in the jury's verdicts. Moreover, Lane's and Bryan's false 
testimony about the incentives given to them by prosecutors in exchange for their 
testimony against Mark could have, in any reasonable likelihood, affected the judgment 
of the jury, or had an effect on the outcome of the trial. For these reasons, the State's 
Brady and Napue violations require that Mark's convictions be vacated and his case 
remanded for a new trial. 
37 Section 18-2510 was enacted in 2012 and replaced other code sections which 
criminalized the possession of contraband in Idaho correctional facilities. The new statute 
"modernize [ d] contraband language to include communication devices which allows 
persons to bypass security and engage in criminal activity inside and outside facility 
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V. 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mark's Rule 35 Motion To Correct An Illegal 
Sentence, Or A Sentence Imposed In An Illegal Manner, Based On Untimeliness 
State argues the mailbox rule does not apply because Mark was still 
represented by counsel when his Rule 35 motion was filed. (Resp't Br., pp.76-83.) As 
explained in his Appellant's Brief, Mark's Rule 35 motion was filed after his notice of 
appeal was filed by his trial counsel, and after the SAPD was appointed to represent him 
on appeal. Counsel took no part in drafting the Rule 35, no part in filing the Rule 35, and 
while both Mark and counsel argued portions of the Rule 35 at the February 12, 2009, 
hearing, Mark handled most of the arguments. (2/12/09 Hrg. Tr., p.15, L.4 p.18, L.23 
(Kovis's Rule 35 argument), p.19, L.2 p.22, L.3 (Mark's Rule 35 argument), p.30, L. 19 
- p.32, L.3 (Mark's response to State's Rule 35 argument). The State disregards Mark's 
reliance on State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 204 (Ct. App. 1990), the facts of which are 
virtually identical to his case, and claims this Court had no idea that the defendant in Lee 
was represented by counsel when it allowed the defendant to rely on the mailbox rule to 
render his otherwise untimely appeal timely. (Resp't Br., pp.81-82.) 
Although Mark maintains Lee is controlling, he also notes that trial counsel was 
not engaged in any activity resembling the practice of law with respect to his Rule 35. 
The practice of law as generally understood, is the doing or 
performing services in a court of justice, in any matter depending [sic] 
therein, throughout its various stages, and in conformity with the adopted 
rules of procedure. But in a larger sense, it includes legal advice and 
counsel, and the preparation of instruments and contracts by which legal 
rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be depending 
{sic J in a court. 
walls. The proposed Section 18-2510, Idaho Code, will enhance safety and security in 
correctional facilities statewide." Statement of Purpose, RS 20850. 
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The drafting of the documents alleged to have been prepared by 
defendant, or the giving of advice and counsel with respect thereto, by one 
not a licensed attorney at law, would constitute an unlawful practice of 
whether or not a charge was made therefor, and even though the 
documents or advice are not actually employed in an action or proceeding 
pending in a court. 
Idaho State Bar v. Meservy, 80 Idaho 504, 508-09 (1959) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted); see also Citibank (S Dakota), NA. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254, 260 
(2009); Idaho State Bar v. Villegas, 126 Idaho 191, 1931 ( 1994 ). 
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized, "When a lawyer prepares 
legal documents on behalf of a prisoner and arranges for those documents to be signed 
and filed, the prisoner is not proceeding without assistance of counsel." Stillman v. 
LaAfarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Here, because trial 
counsel engaged in no activities that would be considered the practice of law with respect 
to the preparation, signing and filing of Mark's Rule 35 motion, the mailbox rules 
applies. Because Mark's Rule 35 motion is timely under the mailbox rule, this Court must 
remand Mark's case for a decision on the merits of his Rule 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained herein and in Mark's Appellant's Brief, this Court 
should vacate Mark's judgment of conviction and sentence, and remand his case for a 
new trial. Alternatively, this Court should vacate the district court's order denying his 
Rule 35 motion as untimely, and remand his case for a decision on the merits. 
DATED this 6th day of October, 2015. 
r. Lankford 
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